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ABSTRACT
We perform a large-scale analysis of third-party trackers on
the World Wide Web. We extract third-party embeddings
from more than 3.5 billion web pages of the CommonCrawl
2012 corpus, and aggregate those to a dataset containing
more than 140 million third-party embeddings in over 41
million domains. To the best of our knowledge, this consti-
tutes the largest empirical web tracking dataset collected so
far, and exceeds related studies by more than an order of
magnitude in the number of domains and web pages ana-
lyzed.
Due to the enormous size of the dataset, we are able to
perform a large-scale study of online tracking, on three lev-
els: (1) On a global level, we give a precise figure for the
extent of tracking, give insights into the structural proper-
ties of the ‘online tracking sphere’ and analyse which track-
ers (and subsequently, which companies) are used by how
many websites. (2) On a country-specific level, we anal-
yse which trackers are used by websites in different coun-
tries, and identify the countries in which websites choose
significantly different trackers than in the rest of the world.
(3) We answer the question whether the content of websites
influences the choice of trackers they use, leveraging more
than ninety thousand categorized domains. In particular,
we analyse whether highly privacy-critical websites about
health and addiction make different choices of trackers than
other websites.
Based on the performed analyses, we confirm that trackers
are widespread (as expected), and that a small number of
trackers dominates the web (Google, Facebook and Twitter).
In particular, the three tracking domains with the highest
PageRank are all owned by Google. The only exception to
this pattern are a few countries such as China and Russia.
Our results suggest that this dominance is strongly associ-
ated with country-specific political factors such as freedom
of the press. Furthermore, our data confirms that Google
still operates services on Chinese websites, despite its pro-
claimed retreat from the Chinese market. We also confirm
that websites with highly privacy-critical content are less
likely to contain trackers (60% vs 90% for other websites),
even though the majority of them still do contain trackers.
1. INTRODUCTION
The ability of a website to track the pages read by its visi-
tors has been present since the beginnings of the World Wide
Web. In recent years however, another tracking mechanism
has become widespread: that of third-party websites embed-
ded into the visited site by mechanisms such as JavaScript
and images. In fact, the majority of websites contain third-
party content, i.e., content from another domain that a visi-
tor’s browser loads and renders upon displaying the website.
Such an embedding of third-party content has always been
possible, but was relatively rare, since most embedded im-
ages were located on the same server as the page itself, and
in any case, the embedding of content was not intended for
tracking.
With the rise of social media and Web 2.0, websites in-
creasingly began to embed links (using various technologies)
to third-party content, and thereby allowed the providers of
such content to track users on a wide scale. Even if tracking
is not the goal of a particular technology, the inclusion of
third-party content occurs for a variety of reasons, e.g., ad-
vertising, conversion tracking, acceleration of content load-
ing, and provision of widgets. Social media and advertising
companies primarily use the data collected via these tracking
mechanisms to improve their capability to show personal-
ized, tailored advertisements to their users, which represent
their main source of income.
Regardless of their primary purpose, third-party compo-
nents can (and in many cases do) track web users across
many sites and record their browsing behavior. Therefore,
these third-parties constitute a privacy hazard in many as-
pects, such as the collection of data about health conditions
[16, 29], news consumption [44], or their instrumentalization
for mass surveillance by intelligence agencies [42]. In order
to understand and control these hazards, it is desirable to
gain a deeper understanding of the ‘online tracking sphere’
as a whole. Previous research has studied small samples
of this sphere, e.g., 1,200 English-language domains from
Alexa’s popular sites [23], while researchers have only re-
cently started to study larger datasets, e.g., tracking on the
Alexa top 1 million domains [28]. The main reason for this is
that, until lately, such a study would only have been possible
for large companies possessing their own ‘copy’ of the web.
Recent developments however allow us to study this online
tracking sphere at a large scale: the availability of enormous
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web crawls comprised of hundreds of terabytes of web data
[38], such as CommonCrawl 2012.1 We process all 3.5 bil-
lion webpages from this corpus (which amounts to more than
200 terabytes of data), and extract the bipartite ‘tracking
graph’, which describes the tracking of more than 41 mil-
lion pay-level domains by 355 tracking services. A pay-level
domain (PLD) is a sub-domain of a public top-level domain
that users pay for individually2. Subsequently, we use this
data to study three key research questions: (i) Which are
the predominant tracking companies on the Web, and how
many websites do they track? (ii) How does the distribu-
tion of web trackers vary from country to country? How
is that variation related to different political, socio-cultural
and economic factors? (iii) How are trackers distributed
with respect to highly privacy-critical topics such as health
and addiction? Do authors of such websites avoid web track-
ers?
To the best of our knowledge, the data extracted in the
paper constitutes the largest empirical dataset of web track-
ers collected so far, containing an order of magnitude more
domains than comparable studies. In this article, we ex-
tend our findings from previous work [37] and provide the
following contributions. (1) We conduct the first analysis
of tracking in the long tail of domains on the web, looking
into 41 million pay-level domains, thereby surpassing previ-
ous work by three orders of magnitude, cf. Section 4. We
identify global structural properties of the online tracking
sphere, e.g., we confirm the extraordinary tracking capa-
bility of Google Analytics (cf. [35, 21]). (2) We uncover
country-specific as well as category-specific patterns in the
relations between third-party trackers by clustering their co-
occurrences. (3) We analyze the tracking company distribu-
tion in top-level domains (TLDs) of non-English speaking
countries, and find that a small set of US-based companies
have a dominating role in the majority of countries; a corre-
lation analysis suggests that this role is strongly associated
with political factors such as freedom of the press. Further-
more, our data confirms the finding that Google still oper-
ates tracking services on Chinese websites, despite its pro-
claimed retreat from the Chinese market [41]. (4) We com-
pare the tracking capabilities on more than ninety thousand
highly privacy-critical and less privacy-critical domains, find-
ing that overall, websites with highly privacy-critical content
do avoid trackers as opposed to other websites, even though
the majority of them still do contain trackers. We also show
that certain types of trackers are in fact present with higher
probability on websites with privacy-critical content, indi-
cating a lack of awareness of the tracking ability of their
underlying services. (5) Finally, we provide our dataset to
the scientific community3 and contribute it to the Koblenz
Network Collection [25]4.
1http://blog.commoncrawl.org/2012/07/
2012-crawl-data-now-available/
2http://webdatacommons.org/structureddata/
vocabulary-usage-analysis/
3https://ssc.io/trackingthetrackers
4http://konect.uni-koblenz.de/networks/trackers-trackers
2. ONLINE TRACKING FUNDAMENTALS
In this section, we give a technical introduction to web
tracking, and highlight resulting privacy implications.
2.1 Technical Foundations
In its basic form, online tracking involves two actors: a
user browsing the Web, and the website that she intention-
ally visits. In addition to these, one or more services may
be present that record her browsing to the website; we call
such services third-parties.
We refer to third-parties as trackers if their main purpose
or the business model of their owning company depends on
collecting browsing data of users. Therefore, we categorize
advertising services and social network plugins as trackers,
because their main source of income comes from targeted,
personalized advertisements which heavily depend on user
data. On the other hand, we do not consider content deliv-
ery networks as trackers, because their main business is to
accelerate website loading (see [23, 17]).
Specifically, the user visits a website, which means that
her browser issues an HTTP “GET” request to the web
server hosting the website. The web server returns an HTTP
response containing the HTML code of the website to ren-
der. This returned HTML code typically contains references
to external resources, such as style sheets, JavaScript code
and images that are required to render the page in the client
browser. Next, the user’s browser automatically issues re-
quests for these additional resources.
In many cases, resources used by a web page reside on
a different server than the one hosting the website. This
possibility allows third-parties to track the user by recording
and inspecting the external requests to their servers.
In the case of online tracking, the website’s HTML code
embeds external resources from a third-party which aims
to track the user. A typical example for such an exter-
nal resource is a piece of JavaScript code, which the user’s
browser will automatically load and execute from the third-
party server. This external loading enables the third-party
to record a wide variety of information about the user: (i)
The third-party sees the current IP address of the user ma-
chine, which reveals the internet service provider as well as
the approximate geolocation of the user. The browser typi-
cally announces its version, the underlying operating system,
the user’s screen resolution and other information which al-
low the third-party to compute a ‘fingerprint’ of the browser.
These fingerprints have been found to be sufficient to rec-
ognize individual users with a high precision [15]. (ii) The
third-party has access to the URI of the page which the user
is currently visiting, and, by looking at the HTTP referrer,
also learns the URI of the previous page the user has visited.
(iii) The third-party is able to read existing cookies desig-
nated for its domain and can set new cookies. If the user
chose to be persistently logged in to a service such as Google,
Facebook or Twitter, these third-parties will recognize the
user as they will receive the persistent login cookies.
Third-parties are either embedded dynamically such as
via JavaScript or the iframe element, or statically via link
or image tags. In the latter case, they lose some of their
tracking abilities such as reading the referrer and browser
properties such as the screen resolution.
...
<div id="rr-social-widget-facebook">
  <iframe src="//www.facebook.com/plugins/
    like.php?href=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com
    %2Ftechcrunch&amp;layout=standard…"…>
  </iframe>
</div>
...
<script type="text/javascript">
  var gaJsHost = (("https:" == document.
   location.protocol)?"https://ssl.":"http://www.");
  document.write(unescape("%3Cscript 
    src='" + gaJsHost + 
    "google-analytics.com/ga.js' 
    type='text/javascript'%3E%3C/script%3E"));
</script>
...
<script src='http://s.gravatar.com/js/
  type='text/javascript' 
  gprofiles.js?aa&#038;ver=3.5-alpha-21304'>
</script>
...
<noscript>
  <img src="http://stats.wordpress.com/
    b.gif?v=noscript" … />
</noscript>
...
facebook.com
google-analytics.com
gravatar.com
wordpress.com
techcrunch.com
bipartite third-party network
. . .
. . .
. . .
http://techcrunch.com 
Figure 1: Example of our extraction process which results in the bipartite third-party network. We parse the HTML code of a
website to extract the pay-level domains of all embedded third-parties. The captured embeddings form edges in the bipartite
third-party network.
2.2 Privacy Implications
Third-parties vary considerably. They include advertisers,
analytics services, social widgets, content delivery networks
and image hosters. All of these have legitimate uses such as
monetization, webpage optimization, A/B testing, conver-
sion tracking, the provision of widgets, and fraud detection.
However, the ability of many third-parties to record large
portions of the browsing behavior of many users across a
huge number of sites on the Web poses a privacy risk, and is
the subject of ongoing legal disputes [40]. The data recorded
by this tracking infrastructure has been reported to con-
tain large portions of online news consumption [44], as well
as intimate, health-related personal data [16, 29], and per-
sonal data from social networks [30, 22]. A large variety of
browser-addons, (e.g., [2, 3, 4]) have been developed to allow
individuals to block online trackers from their computer.
The ability to consume news and form a political opinion
in an independent and unwatched manner, as well as the
privacy of personal health-related data are vital for an open
society, and should not be subject to commercially moti-
vated data collection. Furthermore, recent reports suggest
that intelligence agencies piggyback on online tracking iden-
tifiers to build databases of the surfing behavior of millions
of people [42]. Frighteningly, this data collection seems to
take place outside of the legal supervision of the governments
of many of the people affected.
3. DATA ACQUISITION
3.1 Collection Methodology and Limitations
CommonCrawl 2012 is a very large publicly available crawl
of the web, which consists of more than 3.5 billion HTML
pages and amounts to approximately 210 terabytes in un-
compressed form [38]. While the CommonCrawl 2012 dataset
is four years old as of 2016, we choose it over latter corpora,
as it produces a more faithful representation of the underly-
ing link structure of the web. This is due to the fact that it
has been created using a breadth-first search crawling strat-
egy [27], which leads to a more realistic representation of
the connected network structure of the web compared to
the crawling strategy employed in latter corpora. In these
latter corpora, the crawling process fetched domains from
predefined lists and did not follow links, which results in
a network with an unreasonably sized largest strongly con-
nected component, which is not well suited for structural
analysis.5
During our extraction process, we represent websites and
third-parties by their pay-level domains, basing our data ac-
quisition strategy on the fact that the URLs of third-party
services have to be embedded in the HTML of the web-
sites. Our extractor takes an HTML document as input
and retrieves all embedded domains of third-party services,
as shown in Figure 1. In a first pass through the docu-
ment, we parse the HTML and investigate the src attribute
of script, iframe, link and image tags. In order to also
find third-parties that are embedded via JavaScript code,
we run a parser6 on all JavaScript code (but do not exe-
cute the code itself), and collect string variables that match
a URI pattern. This investigation of the JavaScript parse
tree allows us to also detect trackers that are dynamically
added into the website’s HTML from Javascript code, e.g.,
scorecardresearch.com in the following example:
<script type="text/javascript">document.write(
unescape("%3Cscript src=’" +
(document.location.protocol == "https:" ?
"https://sb" : "http://b") +
".scorecardresearch.com/beacon.js’
%3E%3C/script%3E"));</script>
5http://webdatacommons.org/hyperlinkgraph/2014-04/
topology.html
6https://github.com/google/closure-compiler
Table 1: Networks used in our study.
Count Entities Role
Bipartite third-party network
41,192,060 Website PLDs Left vertex set
12,756,244 Third-party PLDs Right vertex set
140,613,762 Third-party embeddings Edge set
Bipartite tracking network
41,192,060 Website PLDs Left vertex set
355 Tracking PLDs Right vertex set
36,982,655 Third-party embeddings Edge set
Hyperlink network (obtained from webdata commons)
41,192,060 Website PLDs vertex set
623,056,313 Hyperlinks edge set
This approach allows for scaling to unprecedented data
sizes, exceeding related work by more than an order of mag-
nitude in the number of domains and pages analyzed. How-
ever, we note that it also imposes a set of limitations in
comparison to data collection techniques that rely on instru-
menting real browsers or on the collection of users’ HTTP
traces (cf. [21, 35, 29, 17]). One limitation of the use of the
static CommonCrawl corpus is that transient trackers are
excluded, i.e., trackers which are generated from JavaScript
code that is fetched and executed dynamically at render-
ing time of the web page. Furthermore, we do not manu-
ally investigate the data recorded by each of the trackers,
nor information that may influence tracking such as caching
policies. We focus our analysis on the ability of third-parties
to track (instead of the detailed tracking mechanisms) and
on the high-level structural patterns of the tracking sphere.
We run a MapReduce [12] implementation of our extractor
in a massively parallel manner on the CommonCrawl 2012
web corpus, via the Amazon Elastic MapReduce service. In
aggregate, the extraction takes about 60 hours using a clus-
ter of 20 ‘m4.2xlarge’ instances (8 virtual CPUs and 32 GB
of RAM per instance).
3.2 Dataset Statistics and Characteristics
Our dataset contains 3,536,611,510 web pages, which we
aggregate by pay-level domain to create the bipartite third-
party network. This network represents the embeddings of
12,756,244 third-parties (the right vertex set) into 41,192,060
pay-level domains (the left vertex set). We create an edge
between a website domain and a third-party domain when-
ever we find the third-party embedded at least once in the
web pages belonging to a website.
Next, we order the third-parties by the fraction of do-
mains on which they occur and select the top third-parties
for manual labeling. We leave unlabeled the long tail of
third-parties that are only present on a few thousand out
of the 41 million domains to keep the labeling effort man-
ageable. We enrich the data for the resulting 1,375 third-
parties as follows: We determine the registration countries
and registering organizations for the third-party domains.
Then, we manually check the websites of the domains to de-
termine their owning companies, and label the third-parties
according to their purpose and business model. We find 355
pay-level domains to belong to tracking services, as these
match our definition of trackers introduced in Section 2.1.
Thereby, we construct the bipartite tracking network, which
represents the 36,982,655 embeddings of the 355 tracking
services in the 41,192,060 website pay-level domains of our
corpus. Table 1 gives an overview over the datasets we use
for this study. We provide our obtained and curated data
to the scientific community.7
Additionally, we obtain the network of 623,056,313 hyper-
links between the pay-level domains in CommonCrawl [1] for
analyses that leverage the structure of the web.
4. GLOBAL ANALYSIS OF TRACKING
In this section, we study the extracted third-party and
tracking networks to gain insights about the distribution of
online tracking services on the Web. We want to answer
the question to what proportion the browsing behavior of
users on the Web is visible to particular tracking services.
Furthermore, we are interested in how strongly the tracking
capabilities differ among various services. Unfortunately,
there is a lack of openly available data sources that allow to
quantify the number of visitors over time for the 41 million
extracted pay-level domains in 2012. Therefore, we resort
to PageRank [33], a measure of the relevance of websites, as
proxy for ranking them by the traffic which they attract. We
compute the PageRank distribution of the domains in the
hyperlink network to get an importance ranking for all the
pay-level domains in our corpus. Next, we use this distri-
bution to define our main ranking measure for the tracking
capability of a third-party.
4.1 Ranking Third-Parties
We derive a ranking measure for third-parties from the
PageRank value p of the pay-level domains in the hyper-
link network as follows. Let D denote a set of domains to
inspect, e.g., all pay-level domains belonging to a certain
top-level domain, and let t(D) denote the subset {d | d ∈
D ∧ t embedded in d} of domains contained in D having
third-party t embedded. We define the rank share ρD,t of a
third-party t in domain set D as the sum of the PageRank
values of domains from D that have t embedded, normalized
by the overall sum of the PageRank values of domains in D:
ρD,t =
∑
i∈t(D) pi∑
i∈D pi
(rank share)
In some cases, it is useful to look only at the number
of pay-level domains visible to a third-party, regardless of
their individual relevance. In these cases, we additionally
report the domain share dD,t of third-party t in domain set
D as the number of domains t(D) in D having t embedded,
normalized by the overall number of domains in D:
dD,t =
|t(D)|
|D| (domain share)
4.2 Predominant Third-Parties
We first compute the third-parties with the highest rank
share in our corpus. Figure 2 shows the top twenty third-
parties by rank share (and also reports their domain share
as small black bars). By far, the most common third-party
is googleanalytics.com with a rank share of 0.507, which
implies that the pay-level domains embedding googleanal
ytics.com amount to more than half of the mass of the
7available at https://ssc.io/trackingthetrackers/
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Figure 2: Google owns the three tracking websites with the
largest share. The twenty most common third-parties are
shown by rank share. Tracking third-parties are highlighted
in red, and domain share is shown as small black bars.
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of the number of pay-level
domains visible to tracking services in the bipartite tracking
network.
PageRank distribution in our corpus. Its domain share is
0.248, implying that it is embedded on 24.8% of all pay-level
domains. We find that five out of the ten most dominant
third-parties belong to Google. The next dominant family
are social media-related third-parties such as facebook.com,
twitter.com and addthis.com. On the lower end, we find
content delivery services such as twimg.com, the image host-
ing platform of Twitter, the cloud platform Amazon Web-
services (amazonaws.com) and Facebook’s content delivery
platform fbcdn.net. We highlight third-parties that match
our definition of tracking services from Section 2.1 in Fig-
ure 2, which includes the dominant third-party googleanal
ytics.com as well as eight additional out of the twenty pre-
dominant third-parties.
4.3 Differences in Tracking Capability
Next, we study the differences in tracking capability be-
tween individual tracking services. To do that, we restrict
the following analysis to the bipartite tracking network, which
only contains the third-parties that match our definition
of tracking services. We investigate the distribution of the
number of pay-level domains visible to an individual track-
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Figure 4: Heatmap representing the conditional probabil-
ities P (t1 | t2) of encountering tracking third-party t1 (Y
axis) on a website pay-level domain, given that this website
has tracking third-party t2 (X axis) embedded.
ing service. This distribution corresponds to the degree dis-
tribution of the right vertex set in the bipartite tracking
network. Figure 3 shows the corresponding cumulative dis-
tribution function (on logarithmic axes) of this distribution.
We encounter a highly disproportionate distribution: 50%
of the tracking services are embedded on less than ten thou-
sand pay-level domains, while tracking services in the top
1% of the distribution are integrated into more than a mil-
lion pay-level domains. To assess whether this distribution
follows a power law, we apply the methodology by Clauset
and colleagues [11], which uses a goodness-of-fit test to find
a minimum value of the degree from which a power law is
valid, as well as estimates the power law exponent. We find
that starting from degree 6,848, the distribution indeed fol-
lows a power law with exponent 1.725, which is at the upper
end of the range of exponents observed in many other hy-
perlink networks.8
Additionally, we investigate the assortativity of the track-
ing network, and find that low degree domains (websites
with few trackers) tend to connect to high-degree tracking
services. This amounts to a dissortative mixing with a neg-
ative correlation coefficient of −0.1863. The found dissor-
tativity is statistically significant to a p-value under 0.001.
This encountered dissortativity is again consistent with find-
ings for other hyperlink networks.9
4.4 Tracker Co-Occurrences
We now focus on the relationships between individual
pairs of tracking third-parties, in order to answer questions
of the form What proportion of the website domains that em-
bed facebook.com also embed twitter.com? We therefore
compute the conditional probability P (t1 | t2) of encounter-
ing a tracker t1 on a website pay-level domain, given that
it already has another tracker t2 embedded. Figure 4 illus-
8http://konect.uni-koblenz.de/statistics/power
9http://konect.uni-koblenz.de/statistics/assortativity
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Figure 5: Cluster analysis of the co-occurrence network of tracking third-parties using modularity maximization. We manually
derive the labels by investigating the distribution of third-party categories and registration countries inside the clusters.
trates the results for all pairs within the fifteen most pre-
dominant tracking services using a heat map. From this ex-
periment, we make multiple observations. First, we observe
the predominant role of google-analytics.com, having by
far the highest probability of co-occuring with any other
service, consistent with its wide spread over the Web. Fur-
thermore, we find a high agreement in the probability pat-
terns for social media-related services such as facebook.com,
twitter.com and gravatar.com. Additionally, the heatmap
hints at country-specific patterns, hence the isolation of Rus-
sian tracking third-parties yadro.ru, liveinternet.ru and
yandex.ru.
4.5 Cluster Analysis of Co-Occurrences
We focus our analysis on the country-specific and media-
specific patterns that the previous analysis pointed to in the
data. We proceed in two steps to uncover these patterns:
First, we compute the co-occurrence network of tracking ser-
vices to find pairs of trackers that occur on the same sites
very often. Second, we cluster this network using the Lou-
vain method for community detection [7], and inspect the
resulting clusters.
We compute the adjacency matrix of the co-occurrence
network as the one-mode projection A = BTB, with B be-
ing the bi-adjacency matrix of the tracking network [26]. We
use log-likelihood ratio-basedG2 tests [14] to prune its edges;
thereby we only retain tracker pairs which occur more often
than expected. Finally, we cluster the resulting network via
greedy modularity maximization with the Louvain method.
We run a grid search on the hyperparameters of the clus-
tering algorithm and choose the cluster assignments which
result in the highest modularity 1
2m
∑
ij [Aij −
kikj
2m
]δ(ci, cj).
Here, m denotes the number of edges, ki as well as kj refer
to the degrees of vertices i and j, and ci and cj represent
the cluster assignments of vertices i and j. Aij is the weight
of the edge connecting vertices i and j, and δ(ci, cj) is the
Kronecker delta which gives 1 if ci = cj and 0 otherwise.
As a clustering technique, modularity maximization has
an intuitive interpretation as a cost function: For the edges
between all vertices i and j assigned to the same cluster,
it measures the difference between the observed edge weight
Aij and the expected edge weight
kikj
2m
of a randomly rewired
graph. Thereby, a high modularity corresponds to dense
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Figure 6: The ten companies per top-level domain with the highest rank share for a selection of countries. Google, Facebook
and Twitter are highlighted in orange, dark blue, and light blue respectively.
connections inside the clusters, and sparse connections out-
side. We clean up the clustering result by only retaining the
2-core of the resulting co-ocurrence graph, which has 329
trackers connected by 1,857 edges.
Figure 5 illustrates the eleven clusters of trackers found in
our dataset. In order to label the resulting clusters, we look
at types of tracking services (e.g., advertisers or social me-
dia plugins), registration countries of their domains, as well
as at the top-level domains of the website domains which
embed the trackers. We compare the distributions of these
attributes in the clusters to the corresponding distributions
of these attributes in the corpus as a whole. We encounter
four clusters that clearly exhibit country-specific patterns.
All third-parties to which we could attribute a country in
the cluster containing twitter.com and addthis.com be-
long to the United States or to Western European coun-
tries (e.g., Germany, France, Great Britain, Sweden, Fin-
land and Switzerland). This finding is supported by the
fact that leading European advertising and affiliate market-
ing platforms such as criteo.com and zanox.com belong to
this group. The cluster containing liveinternet.ru and
yadro.ru is mostly comprised of third-parties from Eastern
European countries (e.g., Russia, Poland and Belarus). In-
terestingly, it also contains 7% of third-parties registered in
the Netherlands. We attribute this to the fact that many
Russian internet companies are legally based in the Nether-
lands for reasons of taxation [46]. Next, we encounter a clus-
ter containing shinobi.jp which comprises mostly Japanese
third-parties. Finally there is a small cluster which contains
a majority of Chinese third-parties, such as cnzz.com.
Not all clusters lend themselves to a geographic inter-
pretation however. The remaining clusters exhibit simi-
larities in the type of trackers embedded or in the type
of website tracked: We find a very large cluster of mostly
web counter and web analytics services, with representatives
such as shinystat.com and amazingcounters.com. Addi-
tionally, we find a small cluster of sharing widgets (e.g.,
shareaholic.com and tweetmeme.com). A third cluster, rep-
resented by technorati.com and networkedblogs.com, con-
sists mostly of domains related to blogging. The remaining
clusters mostly consist of advertising services.
5. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS
In the previous sections, we have found that the clustering
of the co-occurrence network exhibits clear country-specific
patterns. In order to better understand the relationships
between individual countries and their distribution of web
tracking, we conduct a set of deeper analyses on the country
level. Every country is represented by a top-level domain
such as .de for Germany and .fr for France. We omit the
United States which in addition to its country code-based
top-level domain .us also uses .com, which in turn is also
widely used by non-US websites. We look at the 50 pre-
dominant top-level domains in our corpus and their corre-
sponding countries belonging to many continents, ranging
from Germany (.de) hosting 2.87 million pay-level domains
to Thailand (.th) with 15,858 pay-level domains.
Table 2: Correlation of various country-level indicators with
the tracking dominance of Google, Facebook and Twitter.
Variable Correlation
Democracy index 0.662∗∗∗
Freedom of the press 0.612∗∗∗
Proportion of English speakers 0.343∗
Online ad spending per capita 0.333
US trade volume 0.167
Online ad spending ratio 0.062
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
5.1 Predominant Tracking Companies
per Country
We compute the rank share of tracking services in the
subset of pay-level domains belonging to a specific country,
represented by its top-level domain. We aggregate the re-
sults on company level in order to match a tracker to the
country in which is owning company is based. Then, we
compare the distribution of tracking companies in a specific
country to the distribution of companies in the corpus as a
whole, and to the distribution in the .com top-level domain.
Figure 6 shows the results of this analysis for a selection of
countries: Ireland, Germany, France, Poland, Israel, Turkey,
Korea, China, Russia and Iran. We highlight the bars for the
three globally most dominant companies: Google, Facebook
and Twitter. These three companies have a special role, as
we encounter them in the majority of top ten lists, in many
cases accumulating the largest amount of rank share. Even
among these three, Google has a preeminent position: we
find it in a dominating role in the majority of countries, of-
ten with an amount of rank share that is more than double
of what the second-placed company accumulates. We find
that in many cases, the top ten companies consist of the
three dominant US companies, Google, Facebook and Twit-
ter, accompanied by a set of companies resident in the coun-
try under observation. Examples are Zanox (affiliate mar-
keting) and INFOnline (digital audience measurement) in
Germany, Criteo (advertising) in France, as well as Yandex
and LiveInternet in Russia. These country-resident compa-
nies hardly ever appear in the top ten list of another country.
The pattern of dominance of Google, followed by Facebook
and Twitter is present in the overall corpus as well as in
the vast majority of countries; however there are a few no-
table outliers, e.g., China and Russia where country-resident
companies such as Yandex and CNZZ outrank Google.
5.2 Correlation Analysis of the Dominance of
Google, Facebook and Twitter
We further investigate the country specifics of the three
companies with a dominating role: Google, Facebook and
Twitter. We therefore define a simple, dichotomous measure
of dominance per country. We say that these three compa-
nies have a dominating role in a country if they accumulate
more than half of the mass of the rank share distribution in
the top ten companies. We compute this measure for the 50
countries under investigation in our corpus, and encounter
the dominance pattern for a vast majority of 46 countries.
Only four countries do not exhibit this pattern: China, Rus-
sia, Iran and Ukraine.
We would like to gain insights into factors which explain
these findings. Intuitively, there could be influential factors
of different character, e.g., political (e.g., states purposefully
discriminate foreign companies to uphold control over me-
dia), socio-cultural (e.g., a language is dominant which is
very different from English, making it harder for foreign
companies to enter the market) or economical (e.g., cer-
tain countries might be more attractive to advertisers due
to higher ad spending). We leverage a set of additional data
sources for this analysis: an index describing the democratic
character of a country [39], another index measuring the de-
gree of freedom of the press in a particular country [19], data
about the ratio of English speakers in a country’s popula-
tion [47], as well as population counts [43]. Furthermore,
we include economic data about US foreign trade [45] and
statistics about worldwide ad spending [9].
We compute several country-specific indicator variables
from these additional datasets: Our political indicators con-
sist of the democracy index and the freedom of the press
index. For the latter, we simply revert the existing scale to
make high values indicate high freedom of the press. We
use the percentage of the population which speaks English as
socio-cultural indicator. Finally, we derive several economic
indicators. We compute the online ad spending per capita
as the sum of digital and mobile ad spending per country
normalized by its population. The online ad spending ratio
is the ratio of the sum of digital and mobile and spending
to the overall media ad spending. Lastly, the US trade vol-
ume is the sum of imports and exports of the US with the
given country, normalized by the size of the population of
the country.
We calculate the point-biserial correlation coefficient of
the indicators to our dichotomous dominance variable, in or-
der to measure their strength of association. Table 2 shows
the results. We find a very strong and at the same time
statistically significant correlation with the political indica-
tors, democracy index and freedom of the press. The socio-
cultural indicator, amount of English speakers, is only mod-
erately correlated and only statistically significant at the
0.05 level. The economic indicators, online ad spending per
capita, US trade volume and online ad spending ratio show
low to moderate correlation, which is not statistically sig-
nificant. These findings are surprising as they indicate that
a positive characteristic such as freedom of the press is ac-
companied by a potentially very negative characteristic: the
recording of people’s browsing behavior by companies out-
side of the legal control of the countries institutions.
6. CONTENT-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS
In this section, we investigate how the presence and amount
of trackers in a website is related to its content. We focus
on comparing domains with highly privacy-critical, intimate
content to domains with less critical content. We want to
know whether there is a reduction in tracking due to the
intimate nature of the content. We leverage the DMOZ
database [13], a large, human-edited directory of the Web
which provides an extensive labeling of websites. We define
four highly privacy-critical categories of websites, as well as
four less privacy-critical categories in order to compare the
distribution of trackers among them. We associate every
such defined category with a set of DMOZ labels and ex-
tract the domains of all websites with that label. We repeat
this for all available translations of the label in up to 41 dif-
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Figure 7: Per-company cumulative distribution of the
PageRank of tracked domains with highly privacy-critical
content.
ferent languages. Next, we intersect these domains with the
domains in our corpus. We use the resulting set of labeled
domains as a representative for the category.
This process results in 24,026 health-related domains, orig-
inating from DMOZ labels such as Health/Mental_Health
and Health/Medicine/Surgery and 2,436 addiction-related
domains, which have labels such as Health/Addictions. Fur-
thermore we find 3,421 sexuality-related domains, from la-
bels such as Society/Gay,_Lesbian,_and_Bisexual and 611
domains related to gender identity, which we get by looking
at labels such as Society/Transgendered. We chose these
categories, as the association of a person with the topics
discussed in these websites could potentially result in dis-
crimination against the person (e.g., less chances during job
search due to an illness), or even physical harm (e.g., prose-
cution of homosexual persons with prison or even the death
penalty in some countries). As less privacy-critical cate-
gories, we choose cooking & food (40,698 domains), soc-
cer (11,677 domains), television (5,793 domains) and video
games (12,016 domains). Overall, this analysis includes
91,813 distinct labeled domains.
6.1 Overall Avoidance of Trackers on Highly
Privacy-Critical Websites
We perform a statistical test to find out whether in gen-
eral, privacy-critical websites are more likely to contain track-
ers than privacy-noncritical websites. Table 3 summarises
the total number of analysed websites in both categories
with and without trackers. We observe that across all types
of trackers combined, privacy-critical websites are less likely
to contain trackers than privacy-noncritical websites. In-
deed, about 90% of websites with less privacy-critical con-
tent contain trackers, while only about 60% of websites with
highly privacy-critical content do. This result is significant
to a p-value of p < 0.001. While this confirms that the choice
of including trackers on a website seems to correlate with the
topic of the website, indicating that trackers are avoided on
possibly privacy-incriminating topics, the numbers still show
that a majority of websites with highly privacy-critical con-
tent do contain trackers. This result also raises the question
of which trackers are employed on which type of website,
and whether some type of trackers are preponderant on any
type of website, highly privacy-critical or less so. Therefore,
the next experiment investigates each tracker separately.
Table 3: Number of highly privacy-critical and less privacy-
critical websites with and without trackers. Overall, less
privacy-critical websites are more likely to contain trackers
than highly privacy-critical websites.
Highly critical Less critical
Without trackers 11,001 7,014
With trackers 16,697 57,850
Fraction with trackers 60.3% 89.2%
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Figure 8: Top ten companies embedded on highly privacy-
critical (top) and less privacy-critical domains (bottom).
6.2 Trackers Specifically Present on
Highly Privacy-Critical Websites
In this experiment, we want to find out for each tracker
whether it is represented more on privacy-critical or less-
critical sites. We perform a statistical test based on the
null hypothesis that the trackers are distributed randomly
among all websites, and compare each tracker’s distribution
to that. The results are shown in Table 4. We observe
that the big three trackers (Google, Facebook, and Twit-
ter) are less prevalent on highly privacy-critical websites.
This is consistent with the overall results that websites con-
taining highly privacy-critical content avoid trackers. How-
ever, other trackers are more prevalent on highly privacy-
critical websites than on less privacy-critical ones. These
include AddThis, StatCounter, Amazon, Sharethis, Site Me-
ter, Adobe, and many more. These trackers are from smaller
companies than the big three, but all have in common that
they are likely to be perceived not as tracking services, but as
added functionalities on a website, such as visitor counters,
and sharing buttons, etc. We conjecture that the fact that
these trackers are perceive as less of a threat to privacy leads
them to not be avoided by hosters of highly privacy-critical
websites. Nonetheless, it remains the case that even among
websites with highly privacy-critical content, the most com-
mon trackers are Google, Facebook, AddThis and Twitter
as shown in Figure 8, i.e., the big three overall trackers are
present in the top four spots, with only AddThis have a
larger share of websites than Twitter. Thus, the next exper-
iments analyses the top three trackers specifically.
Table 4: Classification of trackers by the type of website (highly privacy-critical or less privacy-critical) they are more prevalent
on. The table contains all trackers among the 20 most used trackers (by number of websites) which are significantly present
for each type of website.
Prevalent on highly privacy-critical sites Prevalent on less privacy-critical sites
AddThis*** StatCounter*** Amazon*** Sharethis Inc***
Site Meter*** Adobe*** extreme digital*** AddToAny***
Disqus** ClustrMaps*** ShinyStat*** Yahoo* Boardhost***
applied technologies** CommissionJunction* Microsoft***
Histats* Technorati*** Motigo*** fav.or.it.*
Google*** Facebook*** Twitter*** LiveInternet***
FullCircleStudies*** Rakuten* Yandex*** Rambler***
Nielsen*** AOL*** Tradedoubler*** FC2*** Samurai
Factory*** mail.ru*** New Relic*** A8*** Chartbeat***
ValueCommerce*** VibrantMedia*** INFOline***
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
6.3 Distribution of Top Trackers in
Privacy-Critical Websites
We compute the domain share and rank share of the three
top trackers Google, Facebook and Twitter, as determined
in Section 5.1, for all the domains in a particular category,
and list the results in Table 5. Google has by far the highest
domain-share in all categories, indicating that it is present
on exceedingly more domains than any other company (cf.
Table 5a). On average, we encounter Google on 51% of do-
mains per category, in contrast to Facebook and Twitter,
which we see on 26% and 14% of domains only. Surpris-
ingly, the picture changes once we look at rank share instead
of domain share, as shown in Table 5b: Google has less rank
share than Facebook. That suggests that Facebook tracks
less but more prominent domains (in terms of PageRank) for
our defined categories. To further investigate this finding, we
plot the cumulative distribution of ranks corresponding to
tracked domains per company of the highly privacy-critical
categories in log-log scale in Figure 7. Investigating this dis-
tribution confirms our hypothesis that on average, Google
occurs on lower-ranking domains than Facebook and Twit-
ter.
7. RELATED WORK
7.1 Global Analysis of Web Tracking
The analysis of the web tracking phenomenon has received
much attention in the research community. The main nov-
elty in this approach as compared to previous studies is that
our data acquisition technique allows us to look at an order
of magnitude more domains, and several orders of magni-
tude more pages. Furthermore, with the exception of work
by [17], no ranking is applied to tracker occurrences on do-
mains, as our dataset allows to leverage the structure of the
web graph to compute such a ranking (cf. Section 4.1).
[21] investigate web tracking and its privacy implications
on about 1,000 domains by looking at the connections be-
tween visited domains and ‘hidden domains’ (similar to our
bipartite third-party network). They also conduct a country-
specific analysis by looking at tracker on the top 100 domains
for 68 countries, and find Google Analytics to be the dom-
inating tracker. They extend this work in [23] where they
investigate how the amount of tracking develops over time,
both by single trackers as well as on a company level. They
cover 1,200 English-language domains from Alexa top sites
over four years between 2005 and 2008, and detect an in-
creasing aggregation of private data by a decreasing number
of trackers: the penetration of the top 10 trackers among
popular sites has grown from 40% to 70% in the period of
investigation. [35] develop a client-side method for detect-
ing web trackers on 500 popular domains. They create a
taxonomy of five different tracker types, based on how these
manipulate browser state. Analogous to [21], their data sug-
gests a dominating role of Google Analytics. Furthermore,
they estimate how much of users web search browsing ses-
sions is visible to trackers by sampling from query logs, and
find that more than 20% can be covered by several trackers.
Finally, they develop a browser add-on called ‘ShareMeNot’
as a defense mechanism, which removes cookies from cer-
tain web requests. In recent years, research has started to
investigate tracking on a larger numbers of domains. [28]
presents a quantitative analysis of tracking mechanisms on
the top 1 million sites from the Alexa ranking. He finds
that nearly nine in ten websites leak user data to third-
parties, and that a handful of American companies (includ-
ing Google, Facebook and Twitter) receive the vast bulk of
this user data. Again, his data confirms the outstanding
role of Google Analytics. Additionally, [29] researches the
privacy risks imposed by visiting health-related web pages
on the web, based on the top 50 search results for about
2,000 common diseases. He finds that more than two thirds
of these pages leak information about specific conditions,
treatments and diseases to third-parties. [48] develop a novel
defense approach based on k-anomity. For that, they first
process tracking data on 21 million pages from 350,000 do-
mains, collected from traces of 200,000 internet users. Next,
they show to leverage this data collectively and dynamically
identify unsafe elements, and removed these elements from
the requests. [17] present ‘OpenWPM’, a comprehensive
and scalable tracking measurement platform, which simu-
lates real browsing. They use this platform to collect data
on the top 1 million domains from Alexa. Analogous to our
findings, they encouter a heavy-tailed distribution of track-
ing capability, postulate the dominating role of Google An-
alytics and state that many of the top-occurring third-party
domains belong to Google. This constitutes the only related
study that also applies a weighting of occurrences of trackers
on domains. They continue to investigate a wide variety of
aspects of tracking, such as the low adoption of HTTPS en-
cryption by trackers, they evaluate tracking protection tech-
niques, and provide new insights into sophisticated tracking
mechanisms, such as cookie syncing, ‘promiscuous’ cookies,
and previously unknown fingerprinting techniques.
7.2 Web Tracking by Social Networks
Special focus has been given to certain actors that know
about the real identities of internet users, such as online so-
cial networks. [22] investigate the leakage of personally iden-
Table 5: Tracking capabilities of Google, Facebook and Twitter on different categories of domains.
(a) Domain share on highly privacy-critical categories and less
privacy-critical categories of domains.
Google Facebook Twitter
Health 0.473 0.157 0.081
Addiction 0.427 0.152 0.092
Sexuality 0.521 0.299 0.158
Gender Identity 0.462 0.295 0.201
Cooking 0.482 0.176 0.070
Soccer 0.519 0.301 0.160
Television 0.617 0.394 0.239
Video Games 0.590 0.268 0.144
(b) Rank share on highly privacy-critical categories and less
privacy-critical categories of domains..
Google Facebook Twitter
Health 0.903 0.912 0.855
Addiction 0.798 0.959 0.953
Sexuality 0.888 0.989 0.834
Gender Identity 0.802 0.990 0.914
Cooking 0.890 0.925 0.788
Soccer 0.904 0.981 0.840
Television 0.909 0.976 0.839
Video Games 0.916 0.965 0.834
tifiable information from social networks to third-parties and
suggest protection mechanisms. They extend this research
to leakage from online social networks in [24], and find that
similar leakage happens there. [36] exemplarily investigates
the privacy implications of the Facebook like-button. [10]
look at the tracking capabilities of the three major social
networks (Facebook, Twitter and Google+) on the top ten
thousand domains. Analogous to us, they find that tracking
is encountered on all categories of sites, independent of their
content. Furthermore, they show (based on browsing traces)
that up to 77% of a user’s web profile can be reconstructed
by these actors.
7.3 Tracking Mechanisms and Detection
[15] investigates ‘fingerprinting’ techniques, based on ver-
sion and configuration settings of modern web browers. They
find that these techniques work surprisingly well at identi-
fying individual users: for a random browser, only one in
about three hundred thousand browsers will share its finger-
print. Furthermore, they developed a well-known test site10
for investigating such fingerprints. [5] present an in-depth
study of advanced tracking mechanisms such as browser fin-
gerprinting via canvas images, re-spawning of HTTP cookies
via the Adobe Flash plugin and cookie syncing between dif-
ferent trackers. They conclude that modern browers – with
the exception of the Tor Browser ([34]) – fail at effectively
protecting users from most of these techniques. [6] develop a
machine learning-based approach for real-time tracker iden-
tification, which draws its features off a network derived
from of script loading relationships in web pages. [20] in-
spect a graph similar to our bipartite third-party network,
which they derived from user traces collected by a web proxy.
Their aim is to automatically identify trackers among the
third-parties, based on structural properties of their col-
lected graph. They show that simple classifiers such as a
nearest neighbor approach, as well as label propagation tech-
niques perform suprisingly well on this identification task.
[18] investigate the surveillance implications of passive eaves-
droppers (e.g., intelligence agencies) piggybacking on exist-
ing tracking identifiers, and find that this allows them to
reconstruct about two thirds of people’s browsing histories.
7.4 Structural Analysis of CommonCrawl
[38] presents an exploratory analysis of the CommonCrawl
2012 corpus, computing elementary statistics such as the
10https://panopticlick.eff.org
distribution of top-level domains, character encodings and
media types. [27, 31, 32] study the fundamental graph
structure of the web using the CommonCrawl 2012 dataset.
Their findings suggest that the previously reported ‘bow-
tie’ structure from [8] is an artifact of crawling process, and
not a structural property of the web. Furthermore, their
data shows that the distributions of in-degree, out-degree
and sizes of strongly connected components of the page and
host graph do not follow power laws.
8. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The scope of our analysis allows us to make several novel
observations about online tracking. We found that 9 out
of the 20 predominant third-party domains belong to track-
ers, and confirmed the extraordinary tracking capability of
Google Analytics (cf. [35, 21]). Furthermore, we found that
the distribution of the number of website domains tracked
follows a power law, and that the overall tracking network
is of a dissortative character. While there are many small
trackers which are country-specific (e.g., to Germany and
Japan), this is not true for the largest tracking services.
These are Google, Facebook and Twitter, all US companies
acting on a global scale, and representing the largest track-
ers in almost all countries. The exception to this pattern are
a small number of countries such as China, Russia and Iran,
which all have little political ties to the US, and which repre-
sent outliers in terms of political factors such as democracy
and freedom of the press. In particular, we could not de-
termine a statistically significant correlation with economic
factors such as amount of foreign trade between a coun-
try and the US, or with indicators related to ad spending.
These findings lead us to the conclusion that the choice of
tracking software made by website owners is largely inde-
pendent of the website’s topic, and mostly depends on po-
litical factors, mainly whether the country in question has
a functional political relationship with the US. In economi-
cal terms, this confirms that social media companies in US-
friendly countries such as Germany and Japan have a hard
time getting large market share due to the dominance of US
companies Google, Facebook and Twitter, while social me-
dia companies in countries such as Russia and China have
better prospects due to the (voluntary or legislated) avoid-
ance of US companies in those countries. Additionaly, our
findings confirm that Google still operates tracking services
on Chinese websites, despite its proclaimed retreat from the
Chinese market [41].
Our results indicate that the fact that a website cov-
ers highly privacy-critical topics does not imply the lack of
tracking. Even though the rate of tracked websites among
those with highly privacy-critical content is lower than for
other websites (60% versus 90%), the majority of such web-
sites does still contain trackers. One aspect of this high
number is the apparent high number of trackers which are
seemingly not perceived to be as dangerous as Google, Face-
book and Twitter, namely those trackers with implement
services benefitting the website itself, such as visitor coun-
ters. For such websites, our results indicate that they are
even more prevalent on privacy-critical websites. For end
users, we can conclude that tracking is to be expected on all
types of websites, regardless of the topic.
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